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1 Introduction
In this paper, we describe an optimised variant of Wikstro¨m’s mixnet which shuffles vectors
of ElGamal ciphertexts in parallel. We then show in detail that this construction is secure.
A verifiable shuffle takes a packet of ciphertexts, which it re-encrypts and shuffles to pro-
duce an output packet. More specifically, a cryptographic shuffle of ElGamal encryptions
e = (e1, ....,eN) is another list of ElGamal encryptions e
′ = (e′1, ...,e
′
N), which contains the
same plaintexts mi in permuted order. Given e and e
′ we may wish to prove that they have
this relationship, this called a proof of shuffle.
Wikstro¨m’s verifiable mixnet as we refer to it here was first presented in “Proofs of
Restricted Shuffles” by Terelius and Wikstro¨m[2], building onWikstro¨m’s previous work in
[3]. Specifically we take the optimised variant for ElGamal which appears to be in common
use; for instance, it is presented in Haenni et al’s pseudo-code algorithms for implementing
Wikstro¨m’s verifiable mixnet [1]. We extend the mixnet to support parallel shuffles, where
each ei and e
′
i are themselves vectors of related ciphertexts. (The possibility of doing this is
proven by the Wikstro¨m’s result but we wish to show that this particular instance with its
optimisations is secure.)
2 Notation
– Gq is a cyclic group of prime order q in which both the decisional and computational
Diffie-Hellman problems are hard. We will use the multiplicative notation for the group
operation. As usually, by Zq we denote the field of integers modulo q.
– AN is the set of vectors of length N containing elements of A. We will denote vectors in
bold, for instance a. We will denote the ith element using subscript; for instance as ai.
– Similarly, AN×N is the set of square matrices of order N containing elements of A. We
will denote matrices using upper case letters, for instance M. We will denote the ith
column of M as Mi and the element ith row and jth column as Mi, j.
A matrix M, containing only 0 and 1 values, is a permutation matrix, if every column
and every row contains exactly one 1.
– PCh,h1(m,r), for m,r ∈ Zq and h,h1 ∈ Gq, is defined as h
rhm1 (note that h and h1 are
group elements and hence the multiplication here denotes the group multiplication).
PCh,h1(m,r) is known as a Pedersen commitment.
– EPCh,h1,...,hN (m,r), for m ∈ Z
N
q and r ∈ Zq, is defined as h
r
∏
N
i=1 h
mi
i (otherwise known
as an extended Pedersen commitment).
– Ch,h1,...,hN (M,r), for M ∈ Z
N×N
q and r ∈ Z
N
q , is (c1, ...,cn) where ci = h
ri ∏
N
j=1 h
M j,i
j ,
which means that ci is the extended Pedersen commitment to the ith column of M.
– Encg,pk(m,r) for m ∈Gq and r ∈ Zq is (g
r, pkrm) (the ElGamal encryption of the group
element m)
– ReEncg,pk(e,r), for e ∈ G
2
q and r ∈ Zq is (e1g
r,e2pk
r).
– Encg,pk(m,r), for m ∈G
w
q and r ∈ Z
w
q , is Encg,pk(m1,r1), . . . ,Encg,pk(mw,rw)
– ReEncg,pk(e,r), for e ∈ (G
2
q)
w and r ∈ Zwq , is ReEncg,pk(e1,r1), . . . ,ReEncg,pk(ew,rw)
– 〈a,b〉, for a ∈ ZNq and b ∈ Z
N
q is ∑
N
i=1 aibi mod q.
– AB, for A ∈ Zn×mq and B ∈ Z
m×w
q , is a matrix in Z
n×w
q where the value in the ith row and
jth column is equal ∑
m
k=1Ai,kBk, j
– Mx, for M ∈ ZM×Nq and x ∈ Z
N
q , is a vector of length M where ith position is equal to
∑
N
j=1Mi, jx j. (Note that both this and the next definition are consistent with treating x as
a column, and row vector respectively, and applying the definition of matrix multiplica-
tion definition from above.
– xM, for M ∈ ZN×Mq and x ∈ Z
N
q , is a vector of length M where the ith position is equal
to ∑
N
j=1 x jM j,i.
– ax, for a ∈ Zq and x ∈ Z
N
q , is a vector of length N where ith position is equal to axi.
– xa, for a ∈ Zq and x ∈ Z
N
q , is a vector of length N where ith position is equal to x
a
i .
– For two vectors x,y ∈ ZNq we some sometimes abuse notation by writing x+ y, x ∗ y,
and xy to denote the pairwise addition, multiplication, and exponentiation of the vectors
respectively.
– For a matrix M, by piM we denote the permutation of the set {1, . . . ,N} defined by M,
that is such a permutation that for each vector x we have x = (ypi(1), . . . ,ypi(N)), where
y=Mx.
– A binary relation R for a set statements of S and witnessesW is a subset of the cartesian
product of S andW .
– For two binary relations R and R ′, we denote by R∧R ′ a relation between (S∗S′) and
(W ∗W ′) the cartesian product of the statements and witness of R and R ′. The relation
is said to hold when both the subrelations hold.
– For two binary relations R and R ′, we denote by R∨R ′ a relation between (S∗S′) and
(W ∗W ′). The relation is said to hold when either subrelations holds.
– For two binary relations R and R ′ where W =W ′, we denote by R∧R ′ a relation
between (S∗S′) and (W ). The relation is said to hold when both the subrelations hold.
We will abuse notation by writing R∧R ′ whenW 6=W ′ but are both cartesian products
with subgroups in common.
2
3 Shuffle Proof - Description and Proof
Algorithm 1: Interactive ZK-Proof of Extended Shuffle
Common Input :A group generator g ∈ Gq, public key pk ∈ Gq, matrix commitment c ∈ G
N
q ,
commitment parameters h,h1, ...,hN ∈ Gq, ciphertext vectors e1, ...,eN ∈ (G
2
q)
w
and
e′1, ...,e
′
N ∈ (G
2
q)
w
.
Private Input :Permutation matrixM ∈ ZN×Nq , randomness r ∈ Z
N
q and randomness R ∈ Z
w×N
q , such
that c=Ch,h1,...,hN (M,r) and e
′
i = ReEncg,pk(epiM(i),RpiM(i)).
1 V chooses u ∈ ZNq randomly and hands u to P .
2 P computes u′ =Mu. Then P chooses rˆ ∈ ZNq at random and computes
r¯ = r1+ · · ·+rN , r˜ = 〈r,u〉,
r⋄ = rˆN +
N−1
∑
i=1
(
rˆi
N
∏
j=i+1
u′j
)
, r⋆ = Ru
P randomly chooses ωˆ ,ω ′ ∈ ZNq , ω1,ω2,ω3 ∈ Zq, and ω 4 ∈ Z
w
q , and hands the following values to
V :
cˆ0 = h1, cˆi = h
rˆi cˆ
u′i
i−1 (i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}) t1 = h
ω1 t2 = h
ω2 t3 = h
ω3 ∏
N
i=1 h
ω ′i
i
t4 = ReEncg,pk(∏
N
i=1 e
′ω ′i
i ,−ω 4) tˆi = h
ωˆ i cˆ
ω ′i
i−1 (i ∈ {1, . . . ,N})
3 V chooses a challenge c ∈ Zq at random and sends it to P .
4 P then responds,
s1 = ω1+c · r¯ s2 = ω2+c · r
⋄ s3 = ω3+c · r˜ s4 = ω 4+c · r
⋆
sˆ= ωˆ +c · rˆ s′ = ω ′+c ·u′
5 V accepts if and only if
t1 = (∏
N
i=1 ci/∏
N
i=1 hi)
−chs1 t2 = (cˆN/h
∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
−chs2 t3 = (∏
N
i=1 c
ui
i )
−chs3 ∏Ni=1 h
s′i
i
t4 =ReEncg,pk((∏
N
i=1 e
ui
i )
−c ∏
N
i=1 e
′s′i
i ,−s4) tˆi = cˆ
−c
i h
sˆi cˆ
s′i
i−1
3
Formal Security Statement In the security statement for the presented shuffle algorithm,
we will use the following notation.
– Rcom(h,h1, ...,hN)(m,r,m
′,r′) is a relationship between the commitment parameters
(h,h1, ...,hN) and (m,m
′ ∈ZNq r,r
′ ∈Zq)which holds if and only if EPC(m,r) = EPC(m
′,r′)
and m 6=m′.
– Rpi(h,h1, ...,hN ,c)(M,r) is the relationship between the commitment parameters (h,h1, ...,hN),
a commitment c ∈ Gq, a permutation matrix M ∈ Z
N×N
q , and r ∈ Z
N
q which holds if
Ch,h1,...,hN (M,r) = c.
– R
shu f
ReEncg,pk
(g, pk,(e1, ...,eN),(e
′
1, ...,e
′
N))(piM,(r
′
1, ...,r
′
N)), where piM is a permutation of
the set {1, . . .N}, is the relation which holds if an only if e′i =ReEncg,pk(epiM(i),r
′
piM(i)
).
Proposition 1. Algorithm 2 is a perfectly complete, sound, and statistical honest verifier
zero-knowledge 4-message proof of the relationship Rcom∨ (Rpi∧R
shu f
ReEncg,pk
).
Since it is infeasible under the discrete logarithm assumption to find a pair satisfying
Rcom. Thus, the proposition computationally implies a proof of knowledge ofRpi∧R
shu f
ReEncg,pk
.
That is for a statement (h,h1, ...,hN ,c,g, pk,(ei, ...,eN),(e
′
1, ...,e
′
N)) we can extract a witness
(M,r,(r′1, ...,r
′
N)) such thatRpi(h,h1, ...,hN ,c)(M,r) andR
shu f
ReEncg,pk
(g, pk,(e1, ...,eN),(e
′
1, ...,e
′
N))
(piM ,(r
′
1, ...,r
′
N)), unless we find a discrete log.
To prove the proposition, one needs to show the correctness, the zero-knowledge, and
the soundness properties. For completeness of the presentation, we demonstrate those prop-
erties in the following subsections.
Zero-knowledge The honest-verifier zero-knowledge simulator chooses cˆ1, ..., cˆN ∈ Gq,
sˆ,s′,u ∈ ZNq , s4 ∈ Z
w
q , and s1,s2,s3,c ∈ Zq randomly and defines t1, t2, t3, t4, j, tˆi by the equa-
tions in step five.
We can observer that the statistical distance between a real and a simulated transcript is
negligible in q:
– u are distributed uniformly in ZNq in both.
– cˆ1, ..., cˆN are distributed uniformly in both transcripts. In the simulated one, it is easily
seen by construction. In the real transcript cˆi = g
rˆi cˆ
u′i
i−1, where rˆi ∈R Zq, which randomly
distributes them in Gq as well.
– The challenge c is uniformly distributed in both
– In both transcripts, S = s1,s2,s3,s4, sˆ,s
′ are distributed uniformly in their domains by
their definitions (in the simulated transcript it is readily visible; in the real transcript, it
is because ω’s are distributed uniformly).
– In both transcripts, the above values determine the values of t1, t2, t3, t4, tˆ by the equa-
tions of Step 5.
4
Correctness We will now show the above protocol is correct, which means that in an
honest run, the verifier accepts the proof.
We first show the shape of honest cˆi.
cˆ1 = h
rˆ1h
u′1
1 by definition of cˆ1 and cˆ0
cˆ2 = h
rˆ2c
u′2
1 by definition of cˆ2
cˆ2 = h
rˆ2(hrˆ1h
u′1
1 )
u′2 by definition of cˆ1
cˆ2 = h
rˆ2+rˆ1·u
′
2h
u′1·u
′
2
1 by algebraic manipulation
cˆ2 = h
rˆ2+∑
2−1
i=1 rˆi ∏
2
j=i+1 u
′
jh
∏
2
i=1 u
′
i
1 by algebraic manipulation
Now we will continue by induction:
cˆα = h
rˆα cˆ
u′α
α−1 by definition of cˆα
cˆα = h
rˆα (hrˆα−1+∑
α−2
i=1 rˆi ∏
α−1
j=i+1 u
′
jh
∏
α−1
i=1 u
′
i
1 )
u′α by definition of cˆα−1 (ind. hypothesis)
cˆα = h
rˆαh∑
α−1
i=1 rˆi ∏
α
j=i+1 u
′
jh
∏
α
i=1 u
′
i
1 by algebraic manipulation
cˆα = h
rˆα+∑
α−1
i=1 rˆi ∏
α
j=i+1 u
′
jh
∏
α
i=1 u
′
i
1 by algebraic manipulation
Now on to the main thing. Note that in the following, we use the fact that ci is a commitment
to a permutation matrix M (and we will use the definition of a permutation matrix).
t1
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
ci/
N
∏
i=1
hi)
−chs1 verification definition (Step 5)
hω1
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
ci/
N
∏
i=1
hi)
−chs1 by definition of t1
hω1
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
ci/
N
∏
i=1
hi)
−chω1+c·r¯ by definition of s1
(
N
∏
i=1
ci/
N
∏
i=1
hi)
c ?= hc·r¯ by algebraic manipulation
(h∑
N
i=1 ri
N
∏
i=1
hi/
N
∏
i=1
hi)
c ?= hc·∑
N
i=1 ri by definition of ci and r¯
hc·∑
N
i=1 ri = hc·∑
N
i=1 ri by algebraic manipulation
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t2
?
= (cˆN/h
∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
−chs2 verification definition
hω2
?
= (cˆN/h
∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
−chs2 by definition of t2
hω2
?
= (cˆN/h
∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
−chω2+c·r
⋄
by definition of s2
(cˆN/h
∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
c ?= hc·r
⋄
by algebraic manipulation
(hrˆN+∑
N−1
i=1 rˆi ∏
N
j=i+1 u
′
jh
∏
N
i=1 u
′
i
1 /h
∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
c ?= hc·r
⋄
by the properties of cˆN
hc·(rˆN+∑
N−1
i=1 rˆi ∏
N
j=i+1 u
′
j) ?= hc·r
⋄
by algebraic manipulation and definition of u′
hc·(rˆN+∑
N−1
i=1 rˆi ∏
N
j=i+1 u
′
j) = hc·(rˆN+∑
N−1
i=1 rˆi ∏
N
j=i+1 u
′
j) by definition r⋄
t3
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
c
ui
i )
−chs3
N
∏
i=1
h
s′i
i Verification definition
hω3
N
∏
i=1
h
ω ′i
i
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
c
ui
i )
−chs3
N
∏
i=1
h
s′i
i By definition of t3
hω3
N
∏
i=1
h
ω ′i
i
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
c
ui
i )
−chω3+c·r˜
N
∏
i=1
h
ω ′i+c·u
′
i
i By definition of s3 and s
′
i
(
N
∏
i=1
c
ui
i )
c ?= hc·r˜
N
∏
i=1
h
c·u′i
i By algebraic manipulation
(
N
∏
i=1
EPC(Mi,ri)
ui)c
?
= EPC(c ·u′,c · r˜) By definition of ci
(
N
∏
i=1
EPC(Mi,ri)
ui)c
?
= EPC(c ·u′,c · 〈r,u〉) By definition of r˜
(
N
∏
i=1
EPC(uiMi,ri,ui))
c ?= EPC(c ·u′,c · 〈r,u〉) By algebraic manipulation
(EPC(Mu,〈r,u〉))c
?
= EPC(c ·u′,c · 〈r,u〉) By algebraic manipulation
(EPC(c ·Mu,c · 〈r,u〉)
?
= EPC(c ·u′,c · 〈r,u〉) By algebraic manipulation
(EPC(c ·Mu,c · 〈r,u〉) = EPC(c ·Mu,c · 〈r,u〉) By definition u′
6
t4
?
=ReEnc((
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
−c
N
∏
i=1
(e
′s′i
i ),−s4) Verification definition
ReEnc(
N
∏
i=1
e′i
ω ′i ,−ω 4)
?
=ReEnc((
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
−c
N
∏
i=1
(e
′s′i
i ),−s4) By definition of t4
N
∏
i=1
e′i
ω ′iEnc(1,−ω 4)
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
−c
N
∏
i=1
(e
′s′i
i )Enc(1,−s4) By definition of ReEnc
N
∏
i=1
e′i
ω ′iEnc(1,−ω 4)
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
−c
N
∏
i=1
(e
′s′i
i )Enc(1,−ω 4− c · r
⋆) By definition of s4
N
∏
i=1
e′i
ω ′i ?= (
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
−c
N
∏
i=1
(e
′s′i
i )Enc(1,−c · r
⋆) By algebraic manipulation
N
∏
i=1
e′i
ω ′i ?= (
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
−c
N
∏
i=1
(e
′ω ′i+c·u
′
i
i, j )Enc(1,−c · r
⋆) By definition of s′i
(
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
c ?= (
N
∏
i=1
e′i
u′i)cEnc(1,−c · r⋆) By algebraic manipulation
(
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i )
c ?= (
N
∏
i=1
(eiEnc(1,Ri))
ui)cEnc(1,−c · r⋆) By definition of e′ and u′
Enc(1,c · r⋆)
?
= (
N
∏
i=1
Encpk(1,Ri)
ui)c By algebraic manipulation
Enc(1,c · r⋆)
?
= Enc(1,c ·Ru) By algebraic manipulation
Enc(1,c · r⋆) = Enc(1,c · r⋆) By definition of r⋆
tˆi
?
= cˆ−ci h
sˆi cˆ
s′i
i−1 Verification definition
hωˆ i cˆ
ω ′i
i−1
?
= cˆ−ci h
sˆi cˆ
s′i
i−1 By definition of tˆi
hωˆ i cˆ
ω ′i
i−1
?
= cˆ−ci h
ωˆ i+c·rˆi cˆ
ω ′i+c·u
′
i
i−1 By definition of sˆi and s
′
i
cˆci
?
= hc·rˆi cˆ
c·u′i
i−1 By algebraic manipulation
(hrˆi cˆ
u′i
i−1)
c ?= hc·rˆi cˆ
c·u′i
i−1 By definition of cˆi
hc·rˆi cˆ
c·u′i
i−1 = h
c·rˆi cˆ
c·u′i
i−1 By algebraic manipulation
Soundness We follow the structure of the original proof, as presented in [2], and present
the extractor in two parts. First, we show that, for two different transcripts with the same u
but different c, we can extract witness for certain sub-statements. In the extended extractor
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we show that, given witnesses for these sub-statements which hold for n different u, we can
extract witness to the main statements.
Basic extractor. Given two accepting transcripts
(u, cˆ, t1, t2, t3, t4, tˆ,c,s1,s2,s3,s4, sˆ,s
′)
(u, cˆ, t1, t2, t3, t4, tˆ,c
∗,s∗1,s
∗
2,s
∗
3,s
∗
4, sˆ
∗,s′∗)
with c 6= c∗, the basic extractor computes
r¯ = (s1− s
∗
1)/(c− c
∗), r⋄ = (s2− s
∗
2)/(c− c
∗),
r˜ = (s3− s
∗
3)/(c− c
∗), r⋆ = (s4− s
∗
4)/(c− c
∗),
rˆ= (sˆ− sˆ∗)/(c− c∗), u′ = (s′− s′∗)/(c− c∗).
Note that we reuse symbols from the Algorithm 1. While they denote analogous entities,
they are not necessarily identical (if the transcripts have not been obtained in the honest
way).
We will prove that
N
∏
j=1
c j = EPC(1, r¯)
N
∏
j=1
c
u j
j = EPC(u
′, r˜)
N
∏
i=1
e′i
u′i = Encpk(1,r
⋆) ·
N
∏
i=1
e
ui
i
cˆi = PCh,cˆi−1(u
′
i, rˆi) cˆN = PCh,h1(
N
∏
i=1
ui,r
⋄)
The proof consists of simple algebraic transformations:
(
(∏Nj=1 c j)
ct1
(∏Nj=1 c j)
c∗t1
) 1
c−c∗
=
N
∏
j=1
c j Tautology
(
hs1/(∏Ni=1 hi)
−c
hs
∗
1/(∏Ni=1 hi)
−c∗
) 1
c−c∗
=
N
∏
j=1
c j By the verification definition
h
s1−s
∗
1
c−c∗
N
∏
i=1
hi =
N
∏
j=1
c j By algebraic manipulation
EPC(1,
s1− s
∗
1
c− c∗
) =
N
∏
j=1
c j By definition of EPC
EPC(1, r¯) =
N
∏
j=1
c j By definition of r¯
8
(
(∏Nj=1 c
u j
j )
ct3
(∏Nj=1 c
u j
j )
c∗t3
) 1
c−c∗
=
N
∏
j=1
c
u j
j Tautology
(
hs3 ∏
N
i=1 h
s′i
i
hs
∗
3 ∏
N
i=1 h
s′∗i
i
) 1
c−c∗
=
N
∏
j=1
c
u j
j By verification definition
h
s3−s
∗
3
c−c∗
N
∏
i=1
h
s′i−s
′∗
i
c−c∗
i =
N
∏
j=1
c
u j
j By algebraic manipulation
EPC(
s′− s′∗
c− c∗
,
s3− s
∗
3
c− c∗
) =
N
∏
j=1
c
u j
j By definition of EPC
EPC(u′, r˜) =
N
∏
j=1
c
u j
j By definition of u
′ and r˜
(
(∏Ni=1(ei)
ui)ct4
(∏Ni=1 (ei)
ui)c∗ t4
) 1
c−c∗
=
N
∏
i=1
ei
ui Tautology
(
∏
N
i=1(e
′
i)
s′iEnc(1,−s4)
∏
N
i=1(e
′
i)
s′∗i Enc(1,−s∗4)
) 1
c−c∗
=
N
∏
i=1
ei
ui By verification definition
N
∏
i=1
e
′
s′i−s
′∗
i
c−c∗
i Enc(1,
s∗4− s4
c− c∗
) =
N
∏
i=1
ei
ui By algebraic manipulation
N
∏
i=1
e
′
s′
i
−s′∗
i
c−c∗
i = Enc(1,
s4− s
∗
4
c− c∗
)
N
∏
i=1
ei
ui By algebraic manipulation
N
∏
i=1
e′i
u′i = Encpk(1,r
⋆)
N
∏
i=1
ei
ui By definition of r′j and u
′
i
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Now, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}
(
cˆci tˆi
cˆc
∗
i tˆi
) 1
c−c∗
= cˆi Tautology
(
hsˆi cˆ
s′i
i−1
hsˆ
∗
i cˆ
s′∗i
i−1
) 1
c−c∗
= cˆi By verification definition
h
sˆi−sˆ
∗
i
c−c∗ cˆ
s′i−s
′∗
i
c−c∗
i−1 = cˆi By algebraic manipulations
PCh,cˆi−1(
s′i− s
′∗
i
c− c∗
,
sˆi− sˆ
∗
i
c− c∗
) = cˆi By algebraic manipulations
PCh,cˆi−1(u
′
i, rˆi) = cˆi By definition of u
′
i and rˆi
(
cˆcNt2
cˆc
∗
N t2
) 1
c−c∗
= cˆN Tautology
 (h∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
chs2
(h∏
N
i=1 ui
1 )
c∗hs
∗
2
1
c−c∗

= cˆN By verification definition
h
s2−s
∗
2
c−c∗ h
∏
N
i=1 ui
1 = cˆN By algebraic manipulation
PC(
N
∏
i=1
ui,
s2− s
∗
2
c− c∗
) = cˆN By algebraic manipulation
PCh,h1(
N
∏
i=1
ui,r
⋄) = cˆN By definition of r
⋄
Extended Extractor We now sketch the extended extractor which, for a given statement
(see the common input in Algorithm 1), for n different witnesses extracted by the basic
extractor, produces the witnesses to the main statement. Let the collective output of the
basic extractors be denoted as r¯,r⋄, r˜ ∈ Znq, R
⋆ ∈ ZW×Nq , and Rˆ,U
′ ∈ ZN×Nq extracted from
the primary challenges U ∈ ZN×Nq . We denote by Ui the ith column of U which is the
challenge vector from the ith run of the basic extractor, and by U j,i the j element of the
challenge vector from the ith run of the basic extractor.
First note with overwhelming probability the set of Uis is linearly independent, con-
cretely the probability is bounded by
q−2
q
. From linear independence, it follows that their
exists A ∈ ZN×Nq such thatUAl is the lth standard unit vector in Zq which we will denote by
Il . A is the inverse ofU . Clearly,
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cl =
N
∏
i=1
(cUAl )i sinceUAl is Il
cl =
N
∏
i=1
c
∑
N
j=1Ui, jA j,l
i by definition ofUAl
cl =
N
∏
i=1
(
N
∏
j=1
cUi, jA j,l
)
i
by algebraic manipulation
cl =
N
∏
j=1

( N∏
i=1
c
Ui, j
i
)A j,l by algebraic manipulation
cl =
N
∏
j=1
EPC(U ′j, r˜ j)
A j,l by some algebraic manipulation and
N
∏
i=1
c
Ui, j
i = EPC(U
′
j, r˜ j)
cl =
N
∏
j=1
EPC(U ′jA j,l, r˜ jA j,l) by algebraic manipulation
cl = EPC(
N
∑
j=1
U ′jA j,l,〈r˜,Al〉) by algebraic manipulation
cl = EPC(U
′Al,〈r˜,Al〉) by algebraic manipulation
Therefore, we can open c to the matrixM, where the lth column ofM isU ′Al , with random-
ness 〈r˜,Al〉. In other words we open c=U
′A using randomness r˜A.
We expect M to be a permutation matrix, but if it is not, then one can find a witness
to Rcom (which, as has been mentioned, can only happen with negligible probability, under
our security assumptions). We extract in two different ways depending on whether M1 6= 1.
Option one If M1 6= 1, then let u′′ =M1 and note that
u′′ 6= 1 and EPC(1, r¯ j) =
N
∏
i=1
ci =
N
∏
i=1
c
1i
i = EPC(u
′′, r˜A)
in which case we found a witness breaking the commitment scheme.
Option two If M1= 1, then recall Theorem 1 from “Proofs of Restricted Shuffles”, which
states that M is a permutation matrix if and only if M1= 1 and ∏Ni=1〈mi,x〉−∏
N
i=1 xi = 0.
Since M1 = 1 and M is not a permutation matrix, then ∏Ni=1〈mi,x〉 −∏
N
i=1 xi 6= 0. The
Schwartz–Zippel says that if you sample, a non-zero polynomial, at a random point the
chance that it equals zero is negligible in the order of the underlying field; hence, with over-
whelming probability there exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,N} such ∏Ni=1〈mi,U j〉−∏
N
i=1Ui, j 6= 0. Since
this is true with overwhelming probability, we require it to be true and rewind if this is not
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the case. (Strictly speaking we should take N+1 extractions from the basic extractor, if we
recover a different M we win, if we get the same M thenUl+1 is actually independent of M
and the lemma can be applied.)
Let u′′ =MU j and note that
u′′ 6=U ′j Which must be true since
N
∏
i=1
U ′i, j =
N
∏
i=1
Ui, j 6=
N
∏
i=1
u′′i
∏
N
i=1U
′
j = ∏
N
i=1U j follows from the base statements and ∏
N
i=1U j 6= ∏
N
i=1u
′′ by definition
of u′′ and ∏
N
i=1〈mi,U j〉−∏
N
i=1Ui, j 6= 0.
EPC(U ′j, r˜ j) =
N
∏
i=1
c
Ui, j
i = EPC(u
′′,〈r˜A,U j〉)
This completes the proof that M is a permutation matrix or we have found a witness to
Rcom.
The correctness of U ′ We now show that U ′l = MUl for all l ∈ [1,N] or we can find a
witnesses to Rcom. Let u
′′ =MUl and by assumption u
′′ 6=U ′l .
EPC(U ′l , r˜l) =
N
∏
i=1
c
Ui,l
i = EPC(u
′′,〈r˜A,Ul〉)
Extracting the randomness We having shown that if M is not a permutation matrix we
can extract a witness to Rcom. We now show that we can extract R ∈ Z
w×N
q such that e
′
i =
12
ReEncpk(epi(i),Rpi(i)).
el =
N
∏
i=1
(eUAl)i sinceUAl is Il (1)
el =
N
∏
i=1
e
∑
N
j=1Ui, jA j,l
i by definition ofUAl (2)
el =
N
∏
i=1
(
N
∏
j=1
eUi, jA j,l
)
i
by algebraic manipulation (3)
el =
N
∏
j=1
(
N
∏
i=1
eUi, j
)A j,l
by algebraic manipulation (4)
el =
N
∏
j=1
(
N
∏
i=1
e′i
U ′i, jEncpk(1,−R
∗
j)
)A j,l
since
N
∏
i=1
e
Ui, j
i =
N
∏
i=1
e′i
U ′i, jEncpk(1,−R
⋆
j) (5)
el =
N
∏
j=1
(
N
∏
i=1
e′i
U ′i, jA j,lEncpk(1,−R
∗
jA j,l)
)
by algebraic manipulation (6)
el =
N
∏
i=1
e′i
∑
N
j=1U
′
i, jA j,lEncpk(1,−〈R∗,Al〉) by algebraic manipulation (7)
el =
N
∏
i=1
(e′U
′Al)iEncpk(1,−〈R
∗,Al〉) by algebraic manipulation (8)
el =
N
∏
i=1
(e′MUAl )iEncpk(1,−〈R
∗,Al〉) since U’ = MU (9)
el =
N
∏
i=1
(e′MIl )iEncpk(1,−〈R
∗,Al〉) sinceUAl = Il (10)
el =
N
∏
i=1
(e′Ml )iEncpk(1,−〈R
∗,Al〉) since MIl =Ml (11)
el = e
′
pi−1M (l)
Encpk(1,−〈R
∗,Al〉) by definition of piM (12)
(13)
We have now shown that ReEncpk(el,〈R
∗
l ,Al〉) = e
′
pi−1(l)
; hence, Rl = 〈R
∗
l ,Al〉 which con-
cludes the proof.
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